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NOTES AND COMMENT
Appeal and Error; Death; Insurance
Hansen vs. Central-Verein Der Gegenseitigen Unterstultzungs Germania.'
This was an action to recover on a certificate of life insurance, where
the plaintiff based his action on the presumption of the insured's
death, arising from seven years' absence unheard -of. It appeared
from the evidence presented in the case that the insured previously
had had trouble with his wife and children, and finally left home. He
subsequently was arrested and convicted for abandonment, and placed
on probation. Shortly after, he disappeared, and had not been heard of
for more than seven years. It was held that because of these facts,
the presumption of the insured's death did not arise, and the question
as to whether -the insured was in fact deceased was held for the jury.
In regard to the presumption of death arising from seven years'
absence unheard of, the question is presented as to whether that presumption arises where the person, whose continuance in life is in
question, left home under such circumstances that he would not be
expected to communicate with his family.
The presumption of death from long continued absence is of ancient
origin, but the rule which began the presumption after seven years'
absence is comparatively modern. The period of seven years was
adopted because that was the time fixed by acts of the British Parliament relating to bigamy and the termination of life estates and leases.
Accordingly, in conformity with these acts, the courts adopted the
rule that "a person shown not to have been heard of for seven years
by those (if any) who, if he had been alive, would naturally have
heard of him is presumed to be dead, unless the circumstances of the
case are such as to account for his'not being heard of, without assum'2

ing his death."

As a rule the burden of proof is upon the person denying the death,
although the presumption of death from absence will not be indulged
where the circumstances are such as to account for the absent person
without assuming his death. In such cases the burden of proof will
rest upon the party claiming the benefit of the presumption.
Consequently there may be a number of circumstances which will
prevent the inference of death from mere unexplained absence, such
as the desire to conceal his identity.'
The improbability that the
N.W. 571, -Wis.Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 302, 303.
'Matter of Matthews, 75 Misc. 449.
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absent person would have communicated with his home will also rebut
the presumption of death 4, as will the fact that he was a fugitive
from justice5 , although it has been held that the fact that a person
is a fugitive from justice does not as a matter of law prevent the presumption of his death after seven years' absence, although admissible
in evidence to rebut the presumption.8 "The fact that the absent
person is a fugitive from justice does not prevent the presumption
7
from arising, but is admissible to rebut the presumption of death."
The cases in which the rule as to the presumption of death arising
from seven years' absence has been applied in Wisconsin were all
cases where the absent person was upon friendly or affectionate terms
with his family at the time with the single exception of Ewing vs.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.," where there seems to have been some
dissatisfaction with home conditions. Furthermore, it has been held
in Wisconsin that although a person who has not been heard of for
seven years is presumed to be dead, such mere absence, unaccounted
for, raises no presumption as to -the time of his death.9
Hence where the case under discussion showed that before the disappearance of the deceased he was on unfriendly terms with his family
and was also a fugitive from justice as there was an abandonment
charge against him, because of these facts the presumption of death
did not arise, and the question as to whether the insured was in fact
deceased, was held for the jury.
In this case the question arose: Can the Supreme Court review the
action of the trial court in directing a verdict in the absence of an
exception to such direction?
Sec. 274.34, Stats. 1927, provides: "Upon an appeal from a judgment

.... the Supreme Court may review any intermediate order or determination of the court below which involves the merits and necessarily
affects the judgment, appearing upon the record transmitted or returned from the circuit court, whether the same were excepted or not."
This direction of the court may therefore be reviewed without an
exception. Rosenthal vs. Vernon. 10
The cases which hold that an exception is necessary to review an
' Van. Buren v. Syracuse, 72 Misc. 463.
Ashbury v. Sanders, 8 Cal. 62; Van Buren v. Syracuse, 72 Misc. 463, O'Kelly
v. Felker, 71 Ga. 775.
'Mut. Ben. L. Ins.'Co. v. Martin, io8 Ky. II, 55 S.W. 694.
"8 R.C.L. 708, 709.
8 191 W.

299;

21o

N.W. 81g.

'Whitely v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 72 Wis. 170, 39 N.W. 369.
79 Wis. 245, 25o, 251; 48 N.W. 485.
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order directing a verdict are all cases in which it did not appear upon
the face of the verdict that it was rendered by direction of the court,
with the single exception of Holum vs. Chicago, M., and St. P. R.
11
Co.
It is apparent that the court there had no thought of overruling
Rosenthal vs. Vernon, because that case was not mentioned, although
it was decided in the same year and by the same judges who participated in the decision of Rosenthal vs. Vernon.
CARL F. ZEIDLER
Constitutional Law; Statute Taxing Foreign Corporation; Invalid
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, Secy. of State of Washinpton, et al,
49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 204.
The Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion written by
Mr. Justice McReynolds (Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissenting)
declares statutes of the State of Washington providing that a filing fee
and a license Ice be levied on the authorized capital stock of domestic
and foreign corporations is invalid insofar as it relates to foreign corporations. The gist of the case is this:
The legislature of the State of Washington levied a tax in the nature of a filing feel and a license feel upon all corporations, both domestic and foreign, as a necessary condition to the carrying on of
business within that state. Both fhe filing and the license fees were
based upon the total amount of the authorized capital stock and were
graded upon a scale ranging from a twenty-five dollar ($25) minimum
filing fee, and a fifteen dollar ($15) minimum license fee to a maximum fee of three thousand dollars ($3,000) in both cases. The reasons
for declaring the said statutes invalid were that such fees, or taxes,
place a direct burden upon interstate commerce, and attempt to tax
property not within the jurisdiction of the state, which amounts to
a taking of property without due process of law under Art. 14, Sec. i
of the federal constitution.
In Wisconsin we have a statutory provision requiring foreign cor1)orations to pay a filing fee' and an annual license fee 4 but such fees
are levied only on the capital stock employed or to be employed in this
state.
The Washington statutes provided that the tax should be based on
the whole amount of the authorized capital stock. When it is consid"8o Wis. 299, 303;

5o N.W. 99.

Sec. 3836 Remington's Compiled Statutes of Washington.
'Sec. 3841 Id.
Sec. 226.02 subsection 4, Wis. Stat. of 1927.
'Sec. 226.02 subsection 7, Wis. Stat. of 1927.

